Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Communications of the ACM
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Threshold Password-Authenticated Key Exchange
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A method for fast revocation of public key certificates and security capabilities
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Identity-based key agreement protocols from pairings
International Journal of Information Security
Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Provably secure threshold password-authenticated key exchange
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
A simple threshold authenticated key exchange from short secrets
ASIACRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
Simple password-based encrypted key exchange protocols
CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
A new two-party identity-based authenticated key agreement
CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We present a threshold identity-based authenticated key exchange protocol that can be applied to an authenticated server-controlled gateway-user key exchange. The objective is to allow a user and a gateway to establish a shared session key with the permission of the back-end servers, while the back-end servers cannot obtain any information about the established session key. Our protocol has potential applications in strong access control of confidential resources. In particular, our protocol possesses the semantic security and demonstrates several highly-desirable security properties such as key privacy and transparency. We prove the security of the protocol based on the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.