An axiomatization of the nucleolus
International Journal of Game Theory
Axiomatization of the nucleolus
Mathematics of Operations Research
The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game
International Journal of Game Theory
PVS: A Prototype Verification System
CADE-11 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Automated Deduction: Automated Deduction
A Note on An Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
Matching games: the least core and the nucleolus
Mathematics of Operations Research
Verified Real Number Calculations: A Library for Interval Arithmetic
IEEE Transactions on Computers
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Results of game theory are often the keys to decisions of economical and political executives. They are also used to create internal tools of many decision making software. For example, coordination games may be cooperative games, when the players choose the strategies by a consensus decision making process, and game trees are used to represent some key cooperative games. Our theory of cooperative games with transferable utilities makes it possible to deliver a formal certificate that contains statements and proofs with each result of any procedure in theory of cooperative TU-games. Such formal certificates can be archived and audited by independent experts to guarantee that the process that lead to the decision is sound and pertaining. As we use an automated proof checker, the review only has to guarantee that the statements of the certificate are correct. The proofs contained in the certificate are guaranteed automatically by the proof checker and our formal theory.