ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Coloured Petri nets (2nd ed.): basic concepts, analysis methods and practical use: volume 1
Coloured Petri nets (2nd ed.): basic concepts, analysis methods and practical use: volume 1
Communicating and mobile systems: the &pgr;-calculus
Communicating and mobile systems: the &pgr;-calculus
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Key Distribution Protocol for Digital Mobile Communication Systems
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A brief history of process algebra
Theoretical Computer Science - Process algebra
Modeling and verification of cryptographic protocols using coloured petri nets and design/CPN
Nordic Journal of Computing
Static validation of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Another Look at "Provable Security"
Journal of Cryptology
Coloured Petri Nets and CPN Tools for modelling and validation of concurrent systems
International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer (STTT)
Flicker: an execution infrastructure for tcb minimization
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2008
The Scyther Tool: Verification, Falsification, and Analysis of Security Protocols
CAV '08 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
A User-Centric Protocol for Conditional Anonymity Revocation
TrustBus '08 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business
A user-centric federated single sign-on system
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
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Privacy enhancing protocols (PEPs) are a family of protocols that allow secure exchange and management of sensitive user information. They are important in preserving users' privacy in today's open environment. Proof of the correctness of PEPs is necessary before they can be deployed. However, the traditional provable security approach, though well established for verifying cryptographic primitives, is not applicable to PEPs. We apply the formal method of Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs) to construct an executable specification of a representative PEP, namely the Private Information Escrow Bound to Multiple Conditions Protocol (PIEMCP). Formal semantics of the CPN specification allow us to reason about various security properties of PIEMCP using state space analysis techniques. This investigation provides us with preliminary insights for modeling and verification of PEPs in general, demonstrating the benefit of applying the CPN-based formal approach to proving the correctness of PEPs.