Can Moral Hazard Be Resolved by Common-Knowledge in S4n-Knowledge?

  • Authors:
  • Takashi Matsuhisa

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Natural Sciences, Ibaraki National College of Technology, Hitachinaka-shi, Japan 312-8508

  • Venue:
  • AICI '09 Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Computational Intelligence
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

This article investigates the relationship between common-knowledge and agreement in multi-agent system, and to apply the agreement result by common-knowledge to the principal-agent model under non-partition information. We treat the two problems: (1) how we capture the fact that the agents agree on an event or they get consensus on it from epistemic point of view, and (2) how the agreement theorem will be able to make progress to settle a moral hazard problem in the principal-agents model under non-partition information. We shall propose a solution program for the moral hazard in the principal-agents model under non-partition information by common-knowledge. Let us start that the agents have the knowledge structure induced from a reflexive and transitive relation associated with the multi-modal logic S4n. Each agent obtains the membership value of an event under his/her private information, so he/she considers the event as fuzzy set. Specifically consider the situation that the agents commonly know all membership values of the other agents. In this circumstance we shall show the agreement theorem that consensus on the membership values among all agents can still be guaranteed. Furthermore, under certain assumptions we shall show that the moral hazard can be resolved in the principal-agent model when all the expected marginal costs are common-knowledge among the principal and agents.