How to generate cryptographically strong sequences of pseudo-random bits
SIAM Journal on Computing
Simultaneous security of bits in the discrete log
Proc. of a workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology---EUROCRYPT '85
RSA and Rabin functions: certain parts are as hard as the whole
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
The discrete logarithm hides O(log n) bits
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
A hard-core predicate for all one-way functions
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computerized patient information system in a psychiatric unit: five-year experience
Journal of Medical Systems
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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At EuroCrypt '01, Catalano et al. [1] proved that for Paillier's trapdoor function if computing residuosity class is hard, then given a random $w\in\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$ the least significant bit of its class is a hard-core predicate. In this paper, we reconsider the bit security of Paillier's trapdoor function and show that under the same assumption, the most significant bit of the class of w is also a hard-core predicate. In our proof, we use the "guessing and trimming" technique [2] to find a polynomial number of possible values of the class and devise a result checking method to test the validity of them.