Efficient frequency domain video scrambling for content access control
MULTIMEDIA '99 Proceedings of the seventh ACM international conference on Multimedia (Part 1)
Chameleon - A New Kind of Stream Cipher
FSE '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Watercasting: Distributed Watermarking of Multicast Media
NGC '99 Proceedings of the First International COST264 Workshop on Networked Group Communication
A light weight buyer-seller watermarking protocol
Advances in Multimedia
A note on the limits of collusion-resistant watermarks
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Lookup-Table-Based Secure Client-Side Embedding for Spread-Spectrum Watermarks
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Collusion-secure fingerprinting for digital data
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
A buyer-seller watermarking protocol
IEEE Transactions on Image Processing
Fingerprint multicast in secure video streaming
IEEE Transactions on Image Processing
Renewable traitor tracing: a trace-revoke-trace system for anonymous attack
ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
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The security of content distribution is a critical issue that all the content providers have to treat seriously in order to guarantee their business. Emmanuel and Kankanhalli proposed an efficient video-broadcast scheme in [1] which is able to distribute video to many subscribers by multicasting one video copy only. The scheme is also designed to achieve the security such that the illegal distributors can be identified based on the client-side watermarking. In this paper, we present an attack which enables any eavesdropper to create a pirate video of good quality from the protected video. Concretely, an adversary can estimate the secret interference watermark which is used to protect the distributed video by exploiting the statistics of randomly selected video frames/images. To fix the flaw, we propose two alternative countermeasures. One is to encrypt the protected video in transmission, and the other is to modify the interference signal frame by frame. Both countermeasures can disable an eavesdropper to obtain a video of acceptable quality, but maintain the nice features that the original scheme is designed for, i.e., efficiently multicasting the protected video with only one channel; managing the broadcaster copyright; and preventing from framing innocent subscribers.