The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
NetCash: a design for practical electronic currency on the Internet
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Project “anonymity and unobservability in the Internet”
Proceedings of the tenth conference on Computers, freedom and privacy: challenging the assumptions
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
ISDN-MIXes: Untraceable Communication with Small Bandwidth Overhead
Kommunikation in Verteilten Systemen, Grundlagen, Anwendungen, Betrieb, GI/ITG-Fachtagung
ASIACRYPT '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
P5: A Protocol for Scalable Anonymous Communication
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Divisible E-Cash Systems Can Be Truly Anonymous
EUROCRYPT '07 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Toward a software development methodology for anonymity applications
Proceedings of the 2010 EDBT/ICDT Workshops
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Anonymity is an important issue in information security, which its main goal is to protect entities privacy in the systems. Different methods and protocols (with different types of anonymity services) have been developed so far to provide special anonymity requirements of applications. Each of these systems has been developed with different ad hoc approaches. In this paper we present a conceptual framework that makes specification, analysis and design of anonymity applications more systematic. To do this, first we go toward presenting a conceptual model of anonymity which can be used in clear description of different aspects of anonymity. Then we extract a list of anonymity primitives from the existing anonymity providing methods. These primitives are base functions which can be composed to form anonymity services to provide specified anonymity requirements of the system.