Optimal incentive-compatible priority pricing for the M/M/1 queue
Operations Research
Paris metro pricing for the internet
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Internet pricing with a game theoretical approach: concepts and examples
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Optimal multi-layered congestion based pricing schemes for enhanced QoS
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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Determining the price to be levied by the internet service provider(ISP) for the usage of network resources has significant effects on network parameters like revenue rates, congestion across the network and provisioning for multiple differentiated levels of service. Current static and dynamic methods of internet pricing do not provide both optimum quality of service(QoS) and a fair share of gain for both ISP and Internet user. Basic concepts of game theory can be applied to the economics of internet pricing for getting better solutions. In particular, a simple model for dynamic pricing using cooperative game theory provides a better solution for both ISP and the user, achieving a better QoS and balanced gains. In this paper, the competition between the ISP and the user is modeled and we find a Nash equilibrium point from which the ISP and the user would not move out without cooperation. The pricing policy used depends on a weighted average queue length at each node. This helps in reducing frequent price variations and is in the spirit of the random early detection (RED) mechanism used in TCP/IP networks. Our work draws on [1] in various ways. We obtain considerable performance improvements using our approach over that in [1]. In particular, our approach exhibits a congestion improvement in the range of 26 to 37 percent, while exhibiting the social welfare improvement in the range of 30 to 38 percent over the scheme in [1].