Distributed databases principles and systems
Distributed databases principles and systems
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
The composite information systems laboratory (CISL) project a MIT
Data Engineering
Systems development risks in strategic information systems
Information and Software Technology - Information and software economics
Concurrency control in advanced database applications
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Context interchange: sharing the meaning of data
ACM SIGMOD Record
Learning from Notes: organizational issues in groupware implementation
CSCW '92 Proceedings of the 1992 ACM conference on Computer-supported cooperative work
Strategic data planning: lessons from the field
MIS Quarterly
Information assets, technology, and organization
Management Science
Concurrency Control in Distributed Database Systems
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Power, politics, and MIS implementation
Communications of the ACM
Strategic Data Planning Method
Strategic Data Planning Method
Replicated document management in a group communication system
CSCW '88 Proceedings of the 1988 ACM conference on Computer-supported cooperative work
Discovery service design in the EPCglobal network: towards full supply chain visibility
IOT'08 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on The internet of things
A scalable object based discovery service for global tracing of RFID products
DASFAA'12 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Database Systems for Advanced Applications
Data quality: Setting organizational policies
Decision Support Systems
Coopetitive data warehouse: a case study
CAiSE'13 Proceedings of the 25th international conference on Advanced Information Systems Engineering
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This research concerns incentive principles which drive information sharing and affect database value. Many real world centralization and standardization efforts have failed, typically because departments lacked incentives or needed greater local autonomy. While intangible factors such as ''ownership'' have been described as the key to providing incentives, these soft issues have largely eluded formal characterization. Using an incomplete contracts approach from economics, we model the costs and benefits of restructuring organizational control, including critical intangible factors, by explicitly considering the role of data ''ownership''. There are two principal contributions from the approach taken here. First, it defines mathematically precise terms for analysing the incentive costs and benefits of changing control. Second, this theoretical framework leads to the development of a concrete model and seven normative principles for improved database management. These principles may be instrumental to designers in a variety of applications such as the decision to decentralize or to outsource information technology and they can be useful in determining the value of standards and translators. Applications of the proposed theory are also illustrated through case histories.