Channel scrambling for secrecy

  • Authors:
  • Matthieu Bloch

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN

  • Venue:
  • ISIT'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Symposium on Information Theory - Volume 4
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

We investigate the fundamental limits of secure communication over a wiretap channel in which the legitimate receiver is able to scramble the state of the channel. We provide simple single-letter bounds for secrecy capacity, which are useful in several instances. For the full-duplex Gaussian case, we show that jamming with Gaussian noise yields rates within at most 0.5 bits per channel use of secrecy capacity. For the half-duplex binary symmetric channel, we show that jamming is strictly suboptimal in certain regimes.