Privacy amplification by public discussion
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Secret-key reconciliation by public discussion
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Secret Key Agreement from Correlated Source Outputs Using Low Density Parity Check Matrices
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Probability Theory with Applications (Mathematics and Its Applications)
Probability Theory with Applications (Mathematics and Its Applications)
Information-theoretic key agreement: from weak to strong secrecy for free
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Generalized privacy amplification
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory - Part 2
Secrecy capacities for multiple terminals
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Folklore in source coding: information-spectrum approach
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Second-Order Asymptotics in Fixed-Length Source Coding and Intrinsic Randomness
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Capacity-based random codes cannot achieve strong secrecy over symmetric wiretap channels
Proceedings of the 5th International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
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The privacy amplification is a technique to distill a secret key from a random variable by a hash function so that the distilled key and an eavesdropper's random variable is statistically independent. There are two kinds of security criteria for the key distilled by the privacy amplification: the weak security criterion and the strong security criterion. As a technique to distill a secret key, it is known that the encoder of a Slepian-Wolf (the source coding with full side-information at the decoder) code can be used as a hash function for the privacy am plification if we employ the weak security criterion. In this paper, we show that the encoder of a Slepian-Wolf code cannot be used as a hash function for the privacy amplification if we employ the strong security criterion.