An observation on the security of McEliece's public-key cryptosystem
Lecture Notes in Computer Science on Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT'88
Constructions of (q,k,1) difference families with q a prime power and k=4,5
Selected papers of the 14th British conference on Combinatorial conference
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
A method for finding codewords of small weight
Proceedings of the 3rd International Colloquium on Coding Theory and Applications
Good error-correcting codes based on very sparse matrices
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
The capacity of low-density parity-check codes under message-passing decoding
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
On the one-wayness against chosen-plaintext attacks of the Loidreau's modified McEliece PKC
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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Decoding attacks are subjected to McEliece code-based public key cryptosystems. Nowadays, complexity of order 280 is considered to be immune. However, the original McEliece cryptosystem has work factor of order 264 against this kind of attacks. There aren't any immune methods to avoid this kind of attacks except increasing code parameters, whereas, this modifications make McEliece cryptosystem impractical. In this paper we improve the security level of LDPC based McEliece cryptosystem i.e. Baldi's cryptosystem about 223 operations to achieve the work factor of 294, without any remarkable increment in key-size or any decrement in transmission rate or speed of cryptosystem.