Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems
P2P '03 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
PeerTrust: Supporting Reputation-Based Trust for Peer-to-Peer Electronic Communities
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Unstructured peer-to-peer networks for sharing processor cycles
Parallel Computing - Parallel matrix algorithms and applications (PMAA'04)
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Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks provide a decentralized way of sharing resources. In an unsolicited network the peers have too less incentive to behave honestly. To avoid tragedy of commons some sort of an incentive mechanism has to be introduced. Reputation systems provide a good solution for this problem. In a reputation system boot strapping remains a problem. In systems where pseudonyms are cheap (i.e. a peer can enter and get an id and establish itself for a "cheap" cost) white washing becomes a problem. Whereas systems with "costly" pseudonyms become highly prohibitive for new entrants thereby reducing the scalability of the system. In this paper, we propose a mechanism for acquiring pseudonyms so as to avoid white washing while maintaining low entry barriers for new comers.