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ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
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Communications of the ACM
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ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
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CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
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LSCs: Breathing Life into Message Sequence Charts
LSCs: Breathing Life into Message Sequence Charts
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FAST'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Formal aspects in security and trust
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Covert channels are information leaks in systems that use resources to transfer secretly a message. They are a threat for security, performance, but also for a system's profitability. This paper proposes a new approach to detect covert channels from scenario models of protocols. The problem of finding covert channels in scenarios is first modeled as a game, in which a pair of malicious users {S,R} is trying to transfer information while the rest of the protocol tries to prevent it. The messages transferred are encoded by behavioral choices at some precise moments, and decoded by a transducer whose input vocabulary is an observation of the system. We then characterize the presence of a covert channel as the existence of a winning strategy for {S,R} and of a decoder.