A Syntactic Criterion for Injectivity of Authentication Protocols

Authors:
C. J. F. Cremers;S. Mauw;E. P. de Vink
Affiliations:
Eindhoven University of Technology, Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, P.O. Box 513, NL-5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands;Eindhoven University of Technology, Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, P.O. Box 513, NL-5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands;Eindhoven University of Technology, Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, P.O. Box 513, NL-5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands and LIACS, Leiden University, Niels Bohrweg 1, 2333 CA Leide ...
Venue:
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Year:
2005

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Abstract

Injectivity is essential when studying the correctness of authentication protocols, because noninjective protocols may suffer from replay attacks. The standard ways of verifying injectivity either make use of a counting argument, which only seems to be applicable in a verification methodology based on model-checking, or draw conclusions on the basis of the details of the data-model used. We propose and study a property, the loop property, that can be syntactically verified and is sufficient to guarantee injectivity. Our result is generic in the sense that it holds for a wide range of security protocol models, and does not depend on the details of message contents or nonce freshness.