A Coordination-based Methodology for Security Protocol Verification

  • Authors:
  • Giacomo Baldi;Andrea Bracciali;Gianluigi Ferrari;Emilio Tuosto

  • Affiliations:
  • Dipartimento di Informatica, Via F. Buonarroti 2, 56127 Pisa -- Italy;Dipartimento di Informatica, Via F. Buonarroti 2, 56127 Pisa -- Italy;Dipartimento di Informatica, Via F. Buonarroti 2, 56127 Pisa -- Italy;Dipartimento di Informatica, Via F. Buonarroti 2, 56127 Pisa -- Italy

  • Venue:
  • Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

The quest for the formal certification of properties of systems is one of the most challenging research issues in the field of formal methods. It requires the development of formal models together with effective verification techniques. In this paper, we describe a formal methodology for verifying security protocols based on ideas borrowed from the analysis of open systems, where applications interact with one another by dynamically sharing common resources and services in a not fully trusted environment. The methodology is supported by ASPASyA, a tool based on symbolic model checking techniques.