Cryptanalysis and protocol failures
Communications of the ACM
A Formal Language for Cryptographic Protocol Requirements
Designs, Codes and Cryptography - Special issue dedicated to Gustavus J. Simmons
Using CSP to Detect Errors in the TMN Protocol
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Secrecy by typing in security protocols
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Secure group communications using key graphs
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Formalizing GDOI group key management requirements in NPATRL
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Authentication tests and the structure of bundles
Theoretical Computer Science
Key Distribution Protocol for Digital Mobile Communication Systems
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
An Improved Constraint-Based System for the Verification of Security Protocols
SAS '02 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Static Analysis
Intensional specifications of security protocols
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Casper: A Compiler for the Analysis of Security Protocols
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Semantic Model for Authentication Protocols
SP '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
${\mathcal PS}$-LTL for constraint-based security protocol analysis
ICLP'05 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Logic Programming
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We propose a new simple trace logic that can be used to specify local security properties, i.e. security properties that refer to a single participant of the protocol specification. Our technique allows a protocol designer to provide a formal specification of the desired security properties, and integrate it naturally into the design process of cryptographic protocols. Furthermore, the logic can be used for formal verification. We illustrate the utility of our technique by exposing new attacks on the well studied TMN protocol.