A game theory approach for the reallocation of securityforces against terrorist diversionary attacks

  • Authors:
  • Yi-Ming Chen;Dachrahn Wu;Cheng-Kuang Wu

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Information Management, National Central University, Taoyuan County, Taiwan;Department of Economics, National Central University, Taoyuan County, Taiwan;Department of Information Management, National Central University, Taoyuan County, Taiwan

  • Venue:
  • ISI'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Intelligence and security informatics
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

Terrorists tend to coordinate multiple raids which, combined with diversionary sattacks are designed to divert the attention of the security forces, causing them to take a longer time to respond. This in turn enables the terrorists to cause more casualties at their primary target. It is important to efficiently reallocate the available security forces to meet these terrorist attacks, especially when the available resources are limited. In this paper we proposed two game theory-based models for the reallocation of security forces for the purpose of countering both primary and diversionary attacks in an urban environment. The first model is used each target and the "attack on hidden-object game" in which one analyzes the interaction behavior between the security force commander and the terrorists within a zero-sum game. The probability of a primary attack to this target is derived from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The second model uses all these probabilities to compute the Shapley value for each target, in terms of the majority of all probabilities for primary attacks. The Shapley values are then used to create a reallocated set of the limited security forces. Experimental results show the approach proposed in this study is more efficient than the traditional method for dealing with ever more likely gunshot events.