Theoretical Computer Science
Communication and Concurrency
Automatic verification of real-time systems with discrete probability distributions
Theoretical Computer Science
On probabilistic timed automata
Theoretical Computer Science
From Timed Automata to Logic - and Back
MFCS '95 Proceedings of the 20th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Analysing Time Dependent Security Properties in CSP Using PVS
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Decidability of Bisimulation Equivalences for Parallel Timer Processes
CAV '92 Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Computer Aided Verification
Weak Bisimulation for Fully Probabilistic Processes
CAV '97 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Verifying Automata Specifications of Probabilistic Real-time Systems
Proceedings of the Real-Time: Theory in Practice, REX Workshop
Information Flow Analysis in a Discrete-Time Process Algebra
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A decidable notion of timed non-interference
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency specification and programming
A process-algebraic approach for the analysis of probabilistic noninterference
Journal of Computer Security
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on WITS'02
Noninterference and the composability of security properties
SP'88 Proceedings of the 1988 IEEE conference on Security and privacy
Probabilistic Information Flow Security
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Weak bisimulation for Probabilistic Timed Automata
Theoretical Computer Science
Probabilistic Information Flow Security
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
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In multilevel systems it is important to avoid unwanted indirect information flow from higher levels to lower levels, namely the so called covert channels. Initial studies of information flow analysis were performed by abstracting away from time and probability. It is already known that systems that are considered to be secure may turn out to be insecure when time or probability are considered. Recently, work has been done in order to consider also aspects either of time or of probability, but not both. In this paper we propose a general framework, based on Probabilistic Timed Automata, where both probabilistic and timing covert channels can be studied. We define a Non-Interference security property that allows one to express information flow in a timed and probabilistic setting, and we compare the property with analogous properties defined in settings where either time or probability or none of them are taken into account. This allows to classify properties depending on their discerning power.