A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Ariadne: a secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 8th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Securing ad hoc routing protocols
WiSE '02 Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Wireless security
A Calculus of Value Broadcasts
PARLE '93 Proceedings of the 5th International PARLE Conference on Parallel Architectures and Languages Europe
Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing
WMCSA '99 Proceedings of the Second IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computer Systems and Applications
A framework for security analysis of mobile wireless networks
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
Outlier detection using naïve bayes in wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the first ACM international symposium on Design and analysis of intelligent vehicular networks and applications
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
In ad-hoc networks, autonomous wireless nodes can communicate by forwarding messages for each other. For routing protocols in this setting, it is known that a malicious node can perform a variety of attacks just by not behaving according to the specification. Whilst secure versions of routing protocols are under development, little effort has been made to formalise the scenario similarly to developments in the realm of traditional security protocols for secrecy and authentication. We present a broadcast process calculus suitable to describe the behaviour of protocols which require a local memory component for every node. By adding annotations for the origin of messages, we are able to formalise a vital security property in this context, called store authorisation. Furthermore, we describe a static analysis for the detection of violations of this property. For a model of the AODV protocol in our calculus, we are then able to deduce that an attacker may introduce a routing loop in certain networks.