Satisficing games

  • Authors:
  • Wynn C. Stirling;Michael A. Goodrich

  • Affiliations:
  • Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602, USA;Nissan Cambridge Basic Research, 4 Cambridge Center, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA

  • Venue:
  • Information Sciences: an International Journal
  • Year:
  • 1999

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Abstract

Optimization is a mathematical sophistication of the common sense view that decision makers ought to do the best they can, and leads to well known solution concepts for mathematical games. For multi-agent systems in naturalistic settings, however, uncertainty and complexity may subordinate optimal performance to the more moderate goals of functionality and robustness. Moderation is another common sense idea that can be made mathematically precise by defining a notion of comparative rationality, leading to a theory of satisficing games. Preferences in an m-agent satisficing game are characterized by a 2m-dimensional interdependence function, from which the joint m-dimensional gains and losses of the agent system can be derived and compared to determine the set of jointly satisficing decisions. This paradigm permits decision makers in the presence of uncertainty to consider multiple sets of possible actions and make decisions that are both robust and functional. Two well-known games, Prisoner's Dilemma and Battle of the Sexes, are analyzed from this, point of view.