Incentive pricing for optimal provisioning of service class promotion with network

Authors:
Yue Xiao-Ning;Jing Yuan-Wei
Affiliations:
College of Science, Shenyang University, Shenyang, Liaoning, China;Faculty of Information Science & Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang, Liaoning, China
Venue:
CCDC'09 Proceedings of the 21st annual international conference on Chinese control and decision conference
Year:
2009

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Abstract

The dynamic pricing management strategy of network system is established in this paper. By introducing the Cobb-Douglas demand function and using the optimization theory and economic boundary theory, the scalable connection management strategy for QoS-enabled networks is studied to make the benefits of the network system and non-cooperative users maximizing and the calculation methods are presented to give the optimal provisioning and dynamic pricing of multiple service classes networks. In order to encourage and guide the non-cooperative users to select the serving request, which is stable at the optimal provisioning of the network system, the nonlinear and crossly influencing incentive pricing strategy is given by introducing the idea of game theory. The users will be amerced in economy when the demand of users deviate the expectation, this will be benefit to increase the rate of network resource using. This management strategy meets the demands of an increasing number of network users as well as a wide variety of network applications. The rationality and validity is verified by the simulator example.