Maximizing the spread of influence through a social network
Proceedings of the ninth ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Group formation in large social networks: membership, growth, and evolution
Proceedings of the 12th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design
Management Science
First to market is not everything: an analysis of preferential attachment with fitness
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The role of compatibility in the diffusion of technologies through social networks
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Design lessons from the fastest q&a site in the west
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Stimulating skill evolution in market-based crowdsourcing
BPM'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Business process management
An analysis of the structure and dynamics of large-scale Q/A communities
ADBIS'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Advances in databases and information systems
Proceedings of the 18th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Auction-based crowdsourcing supporting skill management
Information Systems
Incentivizing participation in online forums for education
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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Two-sided markets arise when two different types of users may realize gains by interacting with one another through one or more platforms or mediators. We initiate a study of the evolution of such markets. We present an empirical analysis of the value accruing to members of each side of the market, based on the presence of the other side. We codify the range of value curves into a general theoretical model, characterize the equilibrium states of two-sided markets in our model, and prove that each platform will converge to one of these equilibria. We give some early experimental results of the stability of two-sided markets, and close with a theoretical treatment of the formation of different kinds of coalitions in such markets.