Integrating user-perceived quality into Web server design
Proceedings of the 9th international World Wide Web conference on Computer networks : the international journal of computer and telecommunications netowrking
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Controlling high bandwidth aggregates in the network
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Low-rate TCP-targeted denial of service attacks: the shrew vs. the mice and elephants
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
An adaptive virtual queue (AVQ) algorithm for active queue management
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Exploiting the Transients of Adaptation for RoQ Attacks on Internet Resources
ICNP '04 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Defending Against Low-Rate TCP Attacks: Dynamic Detection and Protection
ICNP '04 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Botz-4-sale: surviving organized DDoS attacks that mimic flash crowds
NSDI'05 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 2
HotBots'07 Proceedings of the first conference on First Workshop on Hot Topics in Understanding Botnets
Packet-level traffic measurements from the Sprint IP backbone
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
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This paper proposes a novel model for instigating the "perfect" DDoS attack. Our model uses a combination of network feedback and coordination of attack rates and protocols to achieve a high level of service deniability and low detectability. We demonstrate via extensive simulations that our attack model achieves a higher impact as compared to the Shrew and the RoQ (Reduction of Quality) attacks while the detectability is low. The model adopts botnets in executing/realizing the perfect storm/attack in a real network. We show that executing the attack is not difficult at all. We then briefly describe failures of recent and most relevant detection approaches in mitigating these attacks. The failures of these schemes demonstrate low detectability of our proposed "perfect storm".