Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Inside risks: the uses and abuses of biometrics
Communications of the ACM
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Password hardening based on keystroke dynamics
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Communications of the ACM
Error-tolerant password recovery
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Coding Theorems of Information Theory
Coding Theorems of Information Theory
Information Theory and Reliable Communication
Information Theory and Reliable Communication
Information Theory: Coding Theorems for Discrete Memoryless Systems
Information Theory: Coding Theorems for Discrete Memoryless Systems
Biometric Recognition: Security and Privacy Concerns
IEEE Security and Privacy
Cryptographic Key Generation from Voice
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Enhancing security and privacy in biometrics-based authentication systems
IBM Systems Journal - End-to-end security
Biometric Systems: Technology, Design and Performance Evaluation
Biometric Systems: Technology, Design and Performance Evaluation
Maintaining secrecy when information leakage is unavoidable
Maintaining secrecy when information leakage is unavoidable
IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence
Generating Cancelable Fingerprint Templates
IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence
EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing
Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data
SIAM Journal on Computing
New shielding functions to enhance privacy and prevent misuse of biometric templates
AVBPA'03 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Audio- and video-based biometric person authentication
Cancelable key-based fingerprint templates
ACISP'05 Proceedings of the 10th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
Common randomness in information theory and cryptography. II. CR capacity
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Common randomness and secret key generation with a helper
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Hardening fingerprint Fuzzy vault using password
ICB'07 Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Advances in Biometrics
Secret rate - privacy leakage in biometric systems
ISIT'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Symposium on Information Theory - Volume 4
Information leakage in fuzzy commitment schemes
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Identification and secret-key generation in biometric systems with protected templates
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Multimedia and security
Eigen-model projections for protected on-line signature recognition
BioID'11 Proceedings of the COST 2101 European conference on Biometrics and ID management
An effective biometric cryptosystem combining fingerprints with error correction codes
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Biometric Security from an Information-Theoretical Perspective
Foundations and Trends in Communications and Information Theory
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This paper addresses privacy leakage in biometric secrecy systems. Four settings are investigated. The first one is the standard Ahlswede-Csiszár secret-generation setting in which two terminals observe two correlated sequences. They form a common secret by interchanging a public message. This message should only contain a negligible amount of information about the secret, but here, in addition, we require it to leak as little information as possible about the biometric data. For this first case, the fundamental tradeoff between secret-key and privacy-leakage rates is determined. Also for the second setting, in which the secret is not generated but independently chosen, the fundamental secret-key versus privacy-leakage rate balance is found. Settings three and four focus on zero-leakage systems. Here the public message should only contain a negligible amount of information on both the secret and the biometric sequence. To achieve this, a private key is needed, which can only be observed by the terminals. For both the generated-secret and the chosen-secret model, the regions of achievable secret-key versus private-key rate pairs are determined. For all four settings, the fundamental balance is determined for both unconditional and conditional privacy leakage.