Uniform and ergodic sampling in unstructured peer-to-peer systems with malicious nodes
OPODIS'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Principles of distributed systems
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Awerbuch and Scheideler have shown that peer-to-peer overlays networks can survive Byzantine attacks only if malicious nodes are not able to predict what will be the topology of the network for a given sequence of join and leave operations. In this paper we investigate adversarial strategies by following specific protocols. Our analysis demonstrates first that an adversary can very quickly subvert DHT-based overlays by simply never triggering leave operations. We then show that when all nodes (honest and malicious ones) are imposed on a limited lifetime, the system eventually reaches a stationary regime where the ratio of polluted clusters is bounded, independently from the initial amount of corruption in the system.