A Theory of Communicating Sequential Processes
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Petri nets: an introduction
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Communication and Concurrency
Mathematical Models of Computer Security
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
Classification of Security Properties (Part I: Information Flow)
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
Lectures on Petri Nets I: Basic Models, Advances in Petri Nets, the volumes are based on the Advanced Course on Petri Nets
Process Algebra and Non-interference
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSP and determinism in security modelling
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Observation Based System Security
Fundamenta Informaticae - Special Issue on Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Unwinding in Information Flow Security
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Strong non-leak guarantees for workflow models
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
On intransitive non-interference in some models of concurrency
Foundations of security analysis and design VI
InDico: information flow analysis of business processes for confidentiality requirements
STM'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Security and trust management
Deciding selective declassification of petri nets
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Automatic information flow analysis of business process models
BPM'12 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Business Process Management
Information flow in systems with schedulers, Part I: Definitions
Theoretical Computer Science
On the exploitation of process mining for security audits: the process discovery case
Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
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Several notions of non-interference have been proposed in the literature for studying the problem of confidentiality in concurrent systems. The common feature of these non-interference properties is that they are all defined as extensional properties based on some notion of behavioural equivalence on systems. Here, instead, we address the problem of defining non-interference by looking at the structure of the systems under investigation. We use a simple class of Petri nets, namely, contact-free elementary net systems, as the system model and define structural non-interference properties based on the absence of particular places in the net: such places show that a suitable causality or conflict relation is present between a high-level transition and a low-level one. We characterise one structural property, called PBNI+, which we show to be equivalent to the well-known behavioural property SBNDC. It essentially captures all the positive information flows (that is, a low-level user can deduce that some high-level action has occurred). We start by providing a characterisation of PBNI+ on contact-free elementary net systems, then extend the definition to cope with the richer class of trace nets.