Enhanced McCullagh-Barreto identity-based key exchange protocols with master key forward security

  • Authors:
  • H. Guo;Y. Mu;X. Y. Zhang;Z. J. Li

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Computer Science and Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100083, PR China.;School of Computer Science Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia.;Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute, Zhengzhou 450002, PR China.;School of Computer Science and Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100083, PR China

  • Venue:
  • International Journal of Security and Networks
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Master key forward security is an important property for identity-based key exchange protocols. Unfortunately, most of existing identity-based key exchange protocols do not satisfy this property. In this paper, we firstly analyse Xie's modified protocol to show that signature is undesirable for an identity-based key agreement protocol with the master key forward secrecy. Then we present two improved protocols from McCullagh-Barreto identity-based key agreement protocol to capture the master key forward security. Our first protocol is efficient and its security can be proved with the help of a decisional oracle, while the second one achieves stronger security and its security can be reduced to a computational problem in the random oracle model. The master key forward secrecy is proved under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.