A graph-based system for network-vulnerability analysis
Proceedings of the 1998 workshop on New security paradigms
Highly-resilient, energy-efficient multipath routing in wireless sensor networks
MobiHoc '01 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Ariadne: a secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 8th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Two Formal Analys s of Attack Graphs
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated Generation and Analysis of Attack Graphs
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Rushing attacks and defense in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols
WiSe '03 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security
LEAP: efficient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
SECTOR: secure tracking of node encounters in multi-hop wireless networks
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Scenario graphs and attack graphs
Scenario graphs and attack graphs
INSENS: Intrusion-tolerant routing for wireless sensor networks
Computer Communications
An overview of constraint-based path selection algorithms for QoS routing
IEEE Communications Magazine
Quality-of-service routing for supporting multimedia applications
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Sensor networks are deployed in a variety of environments for unattended operation. In a hostile terrain, sensor nodes are vulnerable to node capture and cryptographic material compromise. Compromised nodes can be used for launching wormhole and sinkhole attacks in order to prevent sensitive data from reaching intended destinations. Our objective in this paper is mitigating the impact of undetected compromised nodes on routing. To this end, we develop metrics for quantifying risk of paths in a network. We then introduce a novel routing approach: Secure-Path Routing (SPR) that uses expected path risk as a parameter in routing. Quantified path risk values are used in routing to reduce traffic flow over nodes that have high expected vulnerability. Selecting low risk routes may lead to the choice of energy-expensive routes. Thus, we develop algorithms for balancing risk with other path selection parameters, including energy consumption. We conduct simulation experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach and study the tradeoff between security and energy. Simulation shows that SPR can be quite effective at increasing traffic flow over legitimate routes and that the impact of SPR on network lifetime is negligible.