Fair end-to-end window-based congestion control
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Understanding TCP vegas: a duality model
Proceedings of the 2001 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
WCDMA for UMTS: Radio Access for Third Generation Mobile Communications
WCDMA for UMTS: Radio Access for Third Generation Mobile Communications
OFDM Wireless LANs: A Theoretical and Practical Guide
OFDM Wireless LANs: A Theoretical and Practical Guide
Closed form solutions for water-filling problems in optimization and game frameworks
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Performance evaluation methodologies and tools
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We consider jamming in wireless networks in the framework of zero-sum games with @a-fairness utility functions. The base station has to distribute the power fairly among the users in the presence of a jammer. The jammer in turn tries to distribute its power among the channels to produce as much harm as possible. The Shannon capacity and the SNIR optimization are particular cases of the proposed more general @a-fairness SNIR based utility functions. Specifically, we consider two @a-fairness utility functions, based on SNIR and Shifted SNIR. This game can also be viewed as a minimax problem against the nature. We show that the game has the unique equilibrium and investigate its properties. In particular, in several important cases we present the equilibrium strategies and Jain's fairness index in closed form. It turns out that there is an important difference between SNIR and Shifted SNIR @a-fairness utility functions. In the case of the SNIR based utility function all users obtain non-zero powers when @a0. On the contrary, when the Shifted SNIR based utility function is used, some users with bad channel conditions might not receive any power at all.