Arrows for secure information flow

Authors:
Peng Li;Steve Zdancewic
Affiliations:
University of Pennsylvania, Department of Computer and Information Science, 3330 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, PA, 19104-6389, USA;University of Pennsylvania, Department of Computer and Information Science, 3330 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, PA, 19104-6389, USA
Venue:
Theoretical Computer Science
Year:
2010

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Abstract

This paper presents an embedded security sublanguage for enforcing information-flow policies in the standard Haskell programming language. The sublanguage provides useful information-flow control mechanisms including dynamic security lattices, run-time code privileges and declassification all without modifying the base language. This design avoids the redundant work of producing new languages, lowers the threshold for adopting security-typed languages, and also provides great flexibility and modularity for using security-policy frameworks. The embedded security sublanguage is designed using a standard combinator interface called arrows. Computations constructed in the sublanguage have static and explicit control-flow components, making it possible to implement information-flow control using static-analysis techniques at run time, while providing strong security guarantees. This paper presents a formal proof that our embedded sublanguage provides noninterference, a concrete Haskell implementation and an example application demonstrating the proposed techniques.