NeXt generation/dynamic spectrum access/cognitive radio wireless networks: a survey
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Competitions and dynamics of duopoly wireless service providers in dynamic spectrum market
Proceedings of the 9th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
eBay in the Sky: strategy-proof wireless spectrum auctions
Proceedings of the 14th ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Revenue generation for truthful spectrum auction in dynamic spectrum access
Proceedings of the tenth ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Spectrum auction framework for access allocation in cognitive radio networks
Proceedings of the tenth ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Competitive spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks: a dynamic game approach
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Cognitive radio: brain-empowered wireless communications
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Multi-Stage Pricing Game for Collusion-Resistant Dynamic Spectrum Allocation
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Non-cooperative spectrum access in cognitive radio networks: A game theoretical model
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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Dynamic spectrum sharing is a promising technology to improve spectrum utilization in future wireless networks. The flexible spectrum management provides new opportunities for licensed primary user and unlicensed secondary users to reallocate the spectrum resource efficiently. In this paper, we present an oligopoly pricing framework for dynamic spectrum allocation in which the primary users sell excessive spectrum to the secondary users for monetary return. We present two approaches, the strict constraints (type-I) and the QoS penalty (type-II), to model the realistic situation that the primary users have limited capacities. In the oligopoly model with strict constraints, we propose a low-complexity searching method to obtain the Nash Equilibrium and prove its uniqueness. When reduced to a duopoly game, we analytically show the interesting gaps in the leader-follower pricing strategy. In the QoS penalty based oligopoly model, a novel variable transformation method is developed to derive the unique Nash Equilibrium. When the market information is limited, we provide three myopically optimal algorithms ''StrictBEST'', ''StrictBR'' and ''QoSBEST'' that enable price adjustment for duopoly primary users based on the Best Response Function (BRF) and the bounded rationality (BR) principles. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our analysis and demonstrate the convergence of ''StrictBEST'' as well as ''QoSBEST'' to the Nash Equilibrium. For the ''StrictBR'' algorithm, we reveal the chaotic behaviors of dynamic price adaptation in response to the learning rates.