Resource pricing under a market-based reservation protocol

  • Authors:
  • Jörg H. Lepler;Karsten Neuhoff

  • Affiliations:
  • Cambridge University, Computer Laboratory, Cambridge, UK;Cambridge University, Faculty of Economics, Cambridge, UK

  • Venue:
  • QofIS'02/ICQT'02 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on quality of future internet services and internet charging and QoS technologies 2nd international conference on From QoS provisioning to QoS charging
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

A reservation protocol and pricing model is proposed for the allocation of electronic services, such as computing and communication resources. Whereas centralised allocation mechanisms are frequently analysed and better understood we focus on a decentralised, bilateral market employing a new protocol to enable application agents to request price quotes and to book resource capacity from resource providers. The protocol is implemented in a simulation of competing providers and clients. It is assumed that contracts and prices are confidential, therefore resource providers can only collect information from their own, bilateral trades and from requests for price quotes. They determine the optimal price with a supply function that is extended to continuously update the optimal price quotes with all new information. The simulated equilibrium prices are above competitive levels and deviations from these prices are not profitable. The exercise of market power increases with lower numbers of resource providers and with higher levels of capacity utilisation.