Undermining an anomaly-based intrusion detection system using common exploits

  • Authors:
  • Kymie M. C. Tan;Kevin S. Killourhy;Roy A. Maxion

  • Affiliations:
  • Dependable Systems Laboratory, Computer Science Department, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;Dependable Systems Laboratory, Computer Science Department, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;Dependable Systems Laboratory, Computer Science Department, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

  • Venue:
  • RAID'02 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Recent advances in intrusion detection
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

Over the past decade many anomaly-detection techniques have been proposed and/or deployed to provide early warnings of cyberattacks, particularly of those attacks involving masqueraders and novel methods. To date, however, there appears to be no study which has identified a systematic method that could be used by an attacker to undermine an anomaly-based intrusion detection system. This paper shows how an adversary can craft an offensive mechanism that renders an anomaly-based intrusion detector blind to the presence of on-going, common attacks. It presents a method that identifies the weaknesses of an anomaly-based intrusion detector, and shows how an attacker can manipulate common attacks to exploit those weaknesses. The paper explores the implications of this threat, and suggests possible improvements for existing and future anomaly-based intrusion detection systems.