A formal approach to security architectures

Authors:
Rainer A. Rueppel
Affiliations:
R3 Security Engineering, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Zürich, Switzerland
Venue:
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Year:
1991

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Abstract

We define a formal language whose symbols are security goals and mechanisms. This allows us to express every security architecture as a string. Designing a security architecture becomes the task of generating a word in the language. Analysing a security architecture becomes the task of parsing a string and determining if it belongs to the language. Since not every complete security architecture achieves its goals equally efficient, we associate a complexity parameter to every goal and mechanism. This allows us to identify complexity- reducing and complexity-increasing mechanisms.