How to break another "provably secure" payment system

  • Authors:
  • Birgit Pfitzmann;Matthias Schunter;Michael Waidner

  • Affiliations:
  • Universität Hildesheim, Institut für Informatik, Hildesheim, Germany;Universität Hildesheim, Institut für Informatik, Hildesheim, Germany;Institut für Rechnerentwurf und Fehlertoleranz, Universität Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe, Germany

  • Venue:
  • EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
  • Year:
  • 1995

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Abstract

At Euroctypt '94, Stefano D'Amiano and Giovanni Di Crescenzo presented a protocol for untraceable electronic cash based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge with preprocessing. It was supposed to be provably secure given this and a few other general cryptographic tools. We show that this protocol nevertheless does not provide any untraceability and has some further weaknesses. We also break another "provably secure" system proposed by Di Crescenzo at CIAC 94. This is the second case of problems with "provably secure" payment systems. Moreover, yet another system with this name tacitly solves a much weaker problem than the seminal paper by Chaum, Fiat, and Naor and most other "practical" papers in this field (de Santis and Persiano, STACS 92). We therefore identify some principal problems with definitions and proofs of such schemes, and sketch better ways to handle them.