Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Communications of the ACM
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
Speeding up secret computations with insecure auxiliary devices
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings on Advances in cryptology
Trust Is not Enough: Privacy and Security in ASP and Web Service Environments
ADBIS '02 Proceedings of the 6th East European Conference on Advances in Databases and Information Systems
CT-RSA '02 Proceedings of the The Cryptographer's Track at the RSA Conference on Topics in Cryptology
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
A Provably Secure Additive and Multiplicative Privacy Homomorphism
ISC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Security
IWDW '07 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Digital Watermarking
Known-plaintext cryptanalysis of the Domingo-Ferrer algebraic privacy homomorphism scheme
Information Processing Letters
An efficient fingerprinting scheme with secret sharing
DRMTICS'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Digital Rights Management: technologies, Issues, Challenges and Systems
Privacy homomorphism for delegation of the computations
NEW2AN'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Next Generation Teletraffic and Wired/Wireless Advanced Networking
Symmetric quantum fully homomorphic encryption with perfect security
Quantum Information Processing
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An additive privacy homomorphism is an encryption function in which the decryption of a sum (or possibly some other operation) of ciphers is the sum of the corresponding messages. Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzos have proposed four different additive privacy homomorphisms. In this paper, we show that two of them are insecure under a ciphertext only attack and the other two can be broken by a known plaintext attack. We also introduce the notion of an R-additive privacy homomorphism, which is essentially an additive privacy homomorphism in which only at most R messages need to be added together. We give an example of an R-additive privacy homomorphism that appears to be secure against a ciphertext only attack.