Authentication theory/coding theory
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Some constructions and bounds for authentication codes
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
A Construction for Authentication/Secrecy Codes from Certain Combinatorial Designs
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
Authentication codes with multiple arbiters
Lecture Notes in Computer Science on Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT'88
Characterization of Optimal Authentication Codes with Arbitration
ACISP '99 Proceedings of the 4th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
On the Construction of Perfect Authentication Codes that Permit Arbitration
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
New Bound on Authentication Code with Arbitration
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Security Notions for Unconditionally Secure Signature Schemes
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Unconditionally Secure Digital Signature Schemes Admitting Transferability
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Bounds for Robust Metering Schemes and Their Relationship with A-code
ASIACRYPT '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Unconditionally Secure Anonymous Encryption and Group Authentication
ASIACRYPT '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
Unconditionally Secure Blind Authentication Codes: The Model, Constructions, and Links to Commitment
Formal to Practical Security
A2-codes from universal hash classes
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Combinatorial Designs for Authentication and Secrecy Codes
Foundations and Trends in Communications and Information Theory
Combinatorial bounds and characterizations of splitting authentication codes
Cryptography and Communications
Unconditionally secure signature schemes revisited
ICITS'11 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information theoretic security
WSEAS Transactions on Mathematics
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In the most general model of message authentication, there are four essential participants: a transmitter who observes an information source, such as a coin toss, and wishes to communicate these observations to a remotely located receiver over a publicly exposed, noiseless, communications channel; a receiver who wishes to not only learn the state of the source (as observed by the transmitter) but also to assure himself that the communications (messages) he accepts actually were sent by the transmitter and that no alterations have been made to them subsequent to the transmitter having sent them, and two other parties, the opponent and the arbiter. The opponent wishes to deceive the receiver into accepting a message that will misinform him as to the state of the source. We assume, in accordance with Kerckhoffs' criteria in cryptography, that the opponent is fully knowledgeable of the authentication system and that in addition he is able to both eavesdrop on legitimate communications in the channel and to introduce fraudulent communications of his own choice. We also assume that he has unlimited computing power, i.e., that any computation which can be done in principal can in fact be done in practice. Given this, the opponent can achieve his objective in either of two ways: 1) he can impersonate the transmitter and send a fraudulent message when in fact no message was sent by the transmitter, or 2) he can wait to intercept a legitimate message from the transmitter and substitute in its stead some other message of his own devising.