Research challenges for the security of control systems
HOTSEC'08 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Hot topics in security
Boundary control of hyperbolic conservation laws using a frequency domain approach
Automatica (Journal of IFAC)
Boundary feedback control in networks of open channels
Automatica (Journal of IFAC)
Attack models and scenarios for networked control systems
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on High Confidence Networked Systems
Model-Driven Performance Analysis of Large Scale Irrigation Networks
ICCPS '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE/ACM Third International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems
SABOT: specification-based payload generation for programmable logic controllers
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Modeling and verification of security properties for critical infrastructure protection
Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research Workshop
A framework for privacy and security analysis of probe-based traffic information systems
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM international conference on High confidence networked systems
On distributed constrained formation control in operator-vehicle adversarial networks
Automatica (Journal of IFAC)
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This article investigates the vulnerabilities of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems which monitor and control the modern day irrigation canal systems. This type of monitoring and control infrastructure is also common for many other water distribution systems. We present a linearized shallow water partial differential equation (PDE) system that can model water flow in a network of canal pools which are equipped with lateral offtakes for water withdrawal and are connected by automated gates. The knowledge of the system dynamics enables us to develop a deception attack scheme based on switching the PDE parameters and proportional (P) boundary control actions, to withdraw water from the pools through offtakes. We briefly discuss the limits on detectability of such attacks. We use a known formulation based on low frequency approximation of the PDE model and an associated proportional integral (PI) controller, to create a stealthy deception scheme capable of compromising the performance of the closed-loop system. We test the proposed attack scheme in simulation, using a shallow water solver; and show that the attack is indeed realizable in practice by implementing it on a physical canal in Southern France: the Gignac canal. A successful field experiment shows that the attack scheme enables us to steal water stealthily from the canal until the end of the attack.