A chosen messages attack on the ISO/IEC 9796-1 signature scheme

  • Authors:
  • François Grieu

  • Affiliations:
  • Innovatron, Paris, France

  • Venue:
  • EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
  • Year:
  • 2000

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Abstract

We introduce an attack against the ISO/IEC 9796-1 digital signature scheme using redundancy, taking advantage of the multiplicative property of the RSA and Rabin cryptosystems. The forged signature of 1 message is obtained from the signature of 3 others for any public exponent v. For even v, the modulus is factored from the signature of 4 messages, or just 2 for v = 2. The attacker must select the above messages from a particular message subset, which size grows exponentialy with the public modulus bit size. The attack is computationally inexpensive, and works for any modulus of 16z, 16z ± 1, or 16z ± 2 bits. This prompts the need to revise ISO/IEC 9796-1, or avoid its use in situations where an adversary could obtain the signature of even a few mostly chosen messages.