A calculus of mobile processes, II
Information and Computation
KLAIM: A Kernel Language for Agents Interaction and Mobility
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Controlling interference in ambients
Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Analyzing security protocols with secrecy types and logic programs
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
TACS '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software
Protection in Programming-Language Translations
ICALP '98 Proceedings of the 25th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Communication Interference in Mobile Boxed Ambients
FST TCS '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Conference Kanpur on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
FoSSaCS '98 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structure
Authenticity by Typing for Security Protocols
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Access control for mobile agents: The calculus of boxed ambients
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Access control in mobile ambient calculi: A comparative view
Theoretical Computer Science
Dynamic policy discovery with remote attestation
FOSSACS'06 Proceedings of the 9th European joint conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We investigate the protection of migrating agents against the untrusted sites they traverse. The resulting calculus provides a formal framework to reason about protection policies and security protocols over distributed, mobile infrastructures, and aims to stand to ambients as the spi calculus stands to π. We present a type system that separates trusted and untrusted data and code, while allowing safe interactions with untrusted sites. We prove that the type system enforces a privacy property, and show the expressiveness of the calculus via examples and an encoding ofthe spi calculus.