An optimal class of symmetric key generation systems
Proc. of the EUROCRYPT 84 workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory and application of cryptographic techniques
SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks
Proceedings of the 7th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A pairwise key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
LEAP: efficient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Security in wireless sensor networks
Communications of the ACM - Wireless sensor networks
Location-aware key management scheme for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
A Key Predistribution Scheme for Sensor Networks Using Deployment Knowledge
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Location-Aware key management using multi-layer grids for wireless sensor networks
ACNS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Towards enhanced key management in multi-phase ZigBee network architecture
Computer Communications
A survey and taxonomy of symmetric key management schemes for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the CUBE International Information Technology Conference
A Role Based Privacy-Aware Secure Routing Protocol for Wireless Mesh Networks
Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal
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It is not easy to achieve secure key establishment in wireless sensor networks without public key cryptography. Many key management protocols have been proposed for the purpose. Among them, LEAP is a simple and elegant protocol that establishes multi-level keys in an efficient way, but its security mainly relies on that of a single initialization key. Though it is assumed that the initial deployment phase is secure and the key is erased from sensor nodes after the initialization in LEAP, the assumption could not be viable for two reasons. First, the same key should be used again for node addition after the initialization phase whereas the new node can be captured before removing the key. Second, the initial deployment of dense networks may not take short as LEAP expected in many cases. This paper rethinks the security of LEAP and proposes a more secure scheme with a new notion of probabilistic time intervals. Rather we localize the impact of key compromise within the time intervals.