CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Key management for encrypted broadcast
CCS '98 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Robust and Secure Broadcasting
INDOCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
On a traitor tracing scheme from ACISP 2003
Information Processing Letters
Efficient Broadcast from Trapdoor Functions
Proceedings of the 2005 conference on Applied Public Key Infrastructure: 4th International Workshop: IWAP 2005
An intelligent and efficient traitor tracing for ubiquitous environments
KES'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Knowledge-Based Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems - Volume Part II
Secure and efficient ID-based group key agreement fitted for Pay-TV
PCM'05 Proceedings of the 6th Pacific-Rim conference on Advances in Multimedia Information Processing - Volume Part II
ICCSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Computational Science and Its Applications - Volume Part IV
Practical pay-TV scheme using traitor tracing scheme for multiple channels
WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
An efficient single-key pirates tracing scheme using cover-free families
ACNS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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We propose an efficient and robust Pay TV scheme for the case when there are a number of streams, as opposed to just one. In our model, the broadcast is divided into billing periods; during each billing period the entitlement of the users does not change. We achieve full flexibility with only a constant factor data redundancy. Our scheme has very little secure memory requirements and does not require the users' secure keys to be changed once they have been written into the secure memory. There is also no upper limit on the number of subscribers. We extend this scheme to have the cracker identification property: If a collusion of less than t users crack their set-top terminals and produce a new decryption key, the exact set of crackers can be efficiently identified with high probability. This property is similar to but different from the traitor tracing schemes of Chor et al [5].