Minimum disclosure proofs of knowledge
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - 27th IEEE Conference on Foundations of Computer Science October 27-29, 1986
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Multiple NonInteractive Zero Knowledge Proofs Under General Assumptions
SIAM Journal on Computing
Universally composable two-party and multi-party secure computation
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Unconditional Security Against Memory-Bounded Adversaries
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
General Composition and Universal Composability in Secure Multi-Party Computation
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Universally Composable Protocols with Relaxed Set-Up Assumptions
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Analyzing Security Protocols Using Time-Bounded Task-PIOAs
Discrete Event Dynamic Systems
Modeling Computational Security in Long-Lived Systems
CONCUR '08 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Concurrency Theory
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
Universally composable quantum multi-party computation
EUROCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the 29th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
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Algorithmic progress and future technology threaten today's cryptographic protocols. Long-term secure protocols should not even in future reveal more information to a--then possibly unlimited--adversary. In this work we initiate the study of protocols which are long-term secure and universally composable. We show that the usual set-up assumptions used for UC protocols (e.g., a common reference string) are not sufficient to achieve long-term secure and composable protocols for commitments or general zero knowledge arguments. Surprisingly, nontrivial zero knowledge protocols are possible based on a coin tossing functionality: We give a long-term secure composable zero knowledge protocol proving the knowledge of the factorisation of a Blum integer. Furthermore we give practical alternatives (e.g., signature cards) to the usual setup-assumptions and show that these allow to implement the important primitives commitment and zero-knowledge argument.