Long-term security and universal composability

  • Authors:
  • Jörn Müller-Quade;Dominique Unruh

  • Affiliations:
  • IAKS, Universität Karlsruhe (TH), Germany;Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

  • Venue:
  • TCC'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Theory of cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

Algorithmic progress and future technology threaten today's cryptographic protocols. Long-term secure protocols should not even in future reveal more information to a--then possibly unlimited--adversary. In this work we initiate the study of protocols which are long-term secure and universally composable. We show that the usual set-up assumptions used for UC protocols (e.g., a common reference string) are not sufficient to achieve long-term secure and composable protocols for commitments or general zero knowledge arguments. Surprisingly, nontrivial zero knowledge protocols are possible based on a coin tossing functionality: We give a long-term secure composable zero knowledge protocol proving the knowledge of the factorisation of a Blum integer. Furthermore we give practical alternatives (e.g., signature cards) to the usual setup-assumptions and show that these allow to implement the important primitives commitment and zero-knowledge argument.