A randomized protocol for signing contracts
Communications of the ACM
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Communication complexity of secure computation (extended abstract)
STOC '92 Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Secure computation with honest-looking parties (extended abstract): what if nobody is truly honest?
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Foundations of Secure Interactive Computing
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Black-box constructions for secure computation
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Session-Key Generation Using Human Passwords Only
Journal of Cryptology
Fairplay—a secure two-party computation system
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
How to generate and exchange secrets
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Proof of Security of Yao’s Protocol for Two-Party Computation
Journal of Cryptology
Smooth projective hashing and two-message oblivious transfer
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Cryptography with constant computational overhead
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Efficient Secure Linear Algebra in the Presence of Covert or Computationally Unbounded Adversaries
CRYPTO 2008 Proceedings of the 28th Annual conference on Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
Constructions of truly practical secure protocols using standardsmartcards
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure Arithmetic Computation with No Honest Majority
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
GUC-Secure Set-Intersection Computation
ProvSec '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Provable Security
Secure Two-Party Computation Is Practical
ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Efficient two party and multi party computation against covert adversaries
EUROCRYPT'08 Proceedings of the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques 27th annual international conference on Advances in cryptology
Efficient fully-simulatable oblivious transfer
CT-RSA'08 Proceedings of the 2008 The Cryptopgraphers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in cryptology
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Bridging game theory and cryptography: recent results and future directions
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Accountability: definition and relationship to verifiability
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Protocols for multiparty coin toss with dishonest majority
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Efficient and secure evaluation of multivariate polynomials and applications
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Efficient implementation of the orlandi protocol
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Privacy-preserving data mining in presence of covert adversaries
ADMA'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Advanced data mining and applications: Part I
Secure set intersection with untrusted hardware tokens
CT-RSA'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Topics in cryptology: CT-RSA 2011
(If) size matters: size-hiding private set intersection
PKC'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Practice and theory in public key cryptography conference on Public key cryptography
AFRICACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Progress in cryptology in Africa
Faster secure two-party computation using garbled circuits
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
Privacy-preserving data mining: a game-theoretic approach
DBSec'11 Proceedings of the 25th annual IFIP WG 11.3 conference on Data and applications security and privacy
On Achieving the “Best of Both Worlds” in Secure Multiparty Computation
SIAM Journal on Computing
Black-Box Constructions of Protocols for Secure Computation
SIAM Journal on Computing
From passive to covert security at low cost
TCC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Truly efficient string oblivious transfer using resettable tamper-proof tokens
TCC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
On the feasibility of consistent computations
PKC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography
Efficient set operations in the presence of malicious adversaries
PKC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography
Partial fairness in secure two-party computation
EUROCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the 29th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Experimenting with fast private set intersection
TRUST'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing
Foundations of garbled circuits
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Salus: a system for server-aided secure function evaluation
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Improved secure two-party computation via information-theoretic garbled circuits
SCN'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
Implementing AES via an actively/covertly secure dishonest-majority MPC protocol
SCN'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
Calling out cheaters: covert security with public verifiability
ASIACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
Privacy-supporting cloud computing by in-browser key translation
Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust Principles
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In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of mutually distrustful parties wish to securely compute some joint function of their private inputs. The computation should be carried out in a secure way, meaning that no coalition of corrupted parties should be able to learn more than specified or somehow cause the result to be "incorrect". Typically, corrupted parties are either assumed to be semi-honest (meaning that they follow the protocol specification) or malicious (meaning that they may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol). However, in many settings, the assumption regarding semi-honest behavior does not suffice and security in the presence of malicious adversaries is excessive and expensive to achieve. In this paper, we introduce the notion of covert adversaries, which we believe faithfully models the adversarial behavior in many commercial, political, and social settings. Covert adversaries have the property that they may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol specification in an attempt to cheat, but do not wish to be "caught" doing so. We provide a definition of security for covert adversaries and show that it is possible to obtain highly efficient protocols that are secure against such adversaries. We stress that in our definition, we quantify over all (possibly malicious) adversaries and do not assume that the adversary behaves in any particular way. Rather, we guarantee that if an adversary deviates from the protocol in a way that would enable it to "cheat", then the honest parties are guaranteed to detect this cheating with good probability. We argue that this level of security is sufficient in many settings.