Safety verification of an aircraft landing protocol: a refinement approach

  • Authors:
  • Shinya Umeno;Nancy Lynch

  • Affiliations:
  • CSAIL, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA;CSAIL, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA

  • Venue:
  • HSCC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Hybrid systems: computation and control
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose a new approach for formal verification of hybrid systems. To do so, we present a new refinement proof technique, a weak refinement using step invariants. As a case study of the approach, we conduct formal verification of the safety properties of NASA's Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS) landing protocol. A new model is presented using the timed I/O automata (TIOA) framework [1], and key safety properties are verified. Using the new refinement technique presented in the paper, we first carry over the safety verification results from the previous discrete model studied in [2] to the new model. We also present properties specific to the new model, such as lower bounds on the spacing of aircraft in specific areas of the airspace.