Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Routing into two parallel links: game-theoretic distributed algorithms
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
Avoiding paradoxes in multi-agent competitive routing
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Topological Conditions for Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Topological Uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium for Selfish Routing with Atomic Users
Mathematics of Operations Research
Capacity management and equilibrium for proportional QoS
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
A survey on networking games in telecommunications
Computers and Operations Research
Architecting noncooperative networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We consider the problem of selfish or competitive routing over a network with flow-dependent costs which is shared by a finite number of users, each wishing to minimize the total cost of its own flow. The Nash Equilibrium is well known to exist for this problem under mild convexity assumptions on the cost function of each user. However, uniqueness requires further conditions, either on the user cost functions or on the network topology. We briefly survey here existing results that pertain to the uniqueness issue. We further consider the mixed Nash-Wardrop problem and propose a common framework that allows a unified treatment of this problem.