Demonstratives, reference, and perception

Authors:
R. A. Young
Affiliations:
Philosophy Department, University of Dundee, Scotland
Venue:
CONTEXT'03 Proceedings of the 4th international and interdisciplinary conference on Modeling and using context
Year:
2003

Citing 1
Cited 2

Reasoning about knowledge

Reasoning about knowledge

Context-Dependent and epistemic uses of attention for perceptual-demonstrative identification

CONTEXT'05 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Modeling and Using Context
Identifying the interaction context in CSCLE

CONTEXT'05 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Modeling and Using Context

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.01

Visualization

Abstract

An account of reference which treats the role of perceptual demonstratives as fundamental is explored. Campbell's[1] account of reference and perceptual demonstratives is discussed, but it is argued that his account of perception is unsatisfactory, and an alternative account is proposed. This account is derived, albeit with substantial modifications, from Lewis[6] and Chisholm[2].