Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete
Communications of the ACM
A secure and privacy-protecting protocol for transmitting personal information between organizations
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Communications of the ACM
Signature schemes based on the strong RSA assumption
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Design and implementation of the idemix anonymous credential system
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Payment Systems and Credential Mechanisms with Provable Security Against Abuse by Individuals
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proceedings of the International Conference on Cryptography: Policy and Algorithms
Proceedings of the 2004 workshop on Multimedia and security
Practical threshold signatures
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Privacy preservation with X.509 standard certificates
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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Due to the growing number of privacy infringement problems, there are increasing demands for privacy enhancing techniques on the Internet. In the PKIs, authorized entities such as CA and RA may become, from the privacy concerns, a big brother even unintentionally since they can always trace the registered users with regard to the public key certificates. In this paper, we investigate a practical method for privacy protection in the existing PKIs by separating the authorities, one for verifying ownership and the other for validating contents, in a blinded manner. The proposed scheme allows both anonymous and pseudonymous certificates to be issued and used in the existing infrastructures in the way that provides conditional traceability and revocability based on the threshold cryptography and selective credential show by exploiting the extension fields of X.509 certificate version 3.