Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Networks without user observability
Computers and Security
Authentication in distributed systems: theory and practice
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Cryptographic defense against traffic analysis
STOC '93 Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Untraceability in mobile networks
MobiCom '95 Proceedings of the 1st annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Privacy vs. authenticity
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
An end-to-end approach to host mobility
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Timestamps in key distribution protocols
Communications of the ACM
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Security Weaknesses in Bluetooth
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
Protocols Using Anonymous Connections: Mobile Applications
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
MIXes in Mobile Communication Systems: Location Management with Privacy
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
SKEME: a versatile secure key exchange mechanism for Internet
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Designated verifier proofs and their applications
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Secret Handshakes from Pairing-Based Key Agreements
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Anonymous Membership Broadcast Schemes
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Authenticity by tagging and typing
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Timed model checking of security protocols
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
k-anonymous secret handshakes with reusable credentials
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Theoretical Computer Science - Special issue: Foundations of wide area network computing
Secure off-the-record messaging
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Timed analysis of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Formal Methods in Security Engineering Workshop (FMSE 04)
Dynamic types for authentication
Journal of Computer Security - Formal Methods in Security Engineering Workshop (FMSE 04)
Formalizing and analyzing sender invariance
FAST'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Formal aspects in security and trust
BLIND: a complete identity protection framework for end-points
SP'04 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Security Protocols
Identity-based key agreement with unilateral identity privacy using pairings
ISPEC'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
Authentication for paranoids: multi-party secret handshakes
ACNS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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Frequently, communication between two principals reveals their identities and presence to third parties. These privacy breaches can occur even if security protocols are in use; indeed, they may even be caused by security protocols. However, with some care, security protocols can provide authentication for principals that wish to communicate while protecting them from monitoring by third parties. This paper discusses the problem of private authentication and presents two protocols for private authentication of mobile principals. In particular, our protocols allow two mobile principals to communicate when they meet at a location if they wish to do so, without the danger of tracking by third parties. The protocols do not make the (dubious) assumption that the principals share a long-term secret or that they get help from an infrastructure of ubiquitous on-line authorities.